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TERRY V. OHIO IN HINDSIGHT: THE
PERILS OF PREDICTING THE PAST

Susan Bandes*
Making a hit list of wrongly decided cases is fun and easy:
mine includes Ex parte McCardle, the Slaughter-House Cases,
Younger v. Harris, McCleskey v. Kemp, DeShaney v. Winnebago
County, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, Bowers v. Hardwick and
others too numerous to mention. At first, I fancied that tracing
the consequences of their obliteration would be easy too. I was
sure I could show, for example, in straight linear progression,
why Hans v. Louisiana should never have been decided, and
how only good consequences (greater government accountability
and a far more cogent eleventh amendment jurisprudence)
would have followed. At the time, that seemed almost too easy,
and so I decided to play the game using what seemed a harder
case: Terry v. Ohio. 1 Now that I have given substantial thought
to the possible consequences of Terry's obliteration, and have
immersed myself in chaos theory for nearly a week, 2 I suspect
that the argument in the other cases would have been more
complex than I originally thought. As to Terry, the complexity
of the analysis is daunting. It raises questions about many
things: from the ways in which law professors use knowledge
from other disciplines, to the feasibility of hindsight analysis, to
the interactions among the many complex systems affected by
constitutional rulemaking.
It's a tough call whether to obliterate Terry. The question
can't be whether Terry was correct when decided, because there
is no way, from our current vantage point, to ignore more than
thirty years of evidence about how it has worked in practice.
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. I would like to thank my brother, Ken
Bandes, for illuminating discussions about chaos theory, and Jim Chen and Tracey
Maclin for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
I. 392 u.s. 1 (1968).
2. Surely sufficient time for a law professor to become proficient at a highly complex field of which she knew nothing previously.
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The rules of this game don't deprive us of our historical knowledge (indeed time travel was specifically mentioned) so the
question must be: in light of what we know now, would we have
been better off without the Terry decision? The question is
complicated by the fact that during the time we were accruing
evidence about the effects of stop and frisk, we were also gaining
a less linear, more sophisticated understanding of the laws of
cause and effect.
Chaos theory studies the behavior of dynamic systems, or
systems that are not in constant equilibrium. It posits that in
such systems, cause and effect are not linear or proportionateinstead, seemingly minor causal agents may lead to disproportionately major effects. The connection among forces in a system may even appear random, though over time more complex
and subtle patterns may appear. But even these patterns will not
be exactly duplicative because each recurrence takes place in a
different environment. Moreover, individual systems do not exist in isolation, but are themselves part of a complex environment that is in a continual state of flux. Changes result from the
interaction of many forces that are constantly changing, as are
the interactions among them. 3
It does seem that chaos theory offers some important lessons here. Take the question: what would have occurred if Terry
had never been decidedt Several interdependent systems
would be affected by this disturbance. 5 But before reviewing all
the possible interactions, let's examine the choices before the
Supreme Court in 1968.
Terry v. Ohio was widely viewed as a compromise. Civil
.libertarians had urged the Court to keep in place the traditional
Fourth Amendment structure, which required that searches and
seizures be accompanied by probable cause and either a warrant
6
or an exception to the warrant requirement. This path would
most likely have meant holding stops and frisks invalid, since
police with probable cause could simply arrest and perform a

3. James Glcick, Chaos: Making a New Science (Viking, 1987); Vincent Di
Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 425, 430-31
(1994).
4. I am assuming that the rules don't permit the more satisfying alternative of assuming that Terry had been decided differently.
5. Or lack of a disturbance, depending on one's chronological vantage point.
6. Sec brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. as amicus
curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Brief of American Civil Liberties Union et al., as
amici curiae, Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. (1968).

1999]

SYMPOSIUM: BANDES
7

493
8

more intrusive search incident to arrest. The Court's solution bringing the practice within the Fourth Amendment by severing
the warrant clause from the reasonableness clause and holding
that certain categories of police conduct need only be reasonable-was billed as a middle ground between the civil libertarian
position and the position that stops and frisks weren't Fourth
Amendment activity at all.
Thirty years later, there is widespread disagreement about
whether Terry succeeded. 9 Although there are strong arguments
on either side, I find this a much easier question than the question of whether some other course would have succeeded better.
Terry has not succeeded. It has had the salutary effect of clarifying that stop and frisk is regulated by the Fourth Amendment,
and therefore subject to judicial review. 10 However, the nature
of the judicial review contemplated-deferential review of discretionary, low profile, street level decisions according to a malleable balancing standard-was poorly suited to achieve the desired result of creating clear guidelines for the use of stop and
frisk. In many ways, Terry has given us the worst of both worlds.
Terry was intentionally more like an opening salvo than a blueprint.11 It offered little guidance about what sorts of police conduct would be permissible and coupled the lack of guidance with
a new broad permission to balance public safety against the
rights of suspects. As Wayne LaFave said at the time, the decision "[left] room for later movement in almost any direction." 12
It should come as no surprise that such movement by the lower
courts, prosecutors, police, and even the Supreme Court itself
7. As Tracey Maclin correctly points out, stop and frisk would likely have continued under any circumstances, but absent Terry, its fruits would have been inadmissible.
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1271, 1287 (1998).
8. Supported by the Brief of the National District Attorneys' Association, as amicus curiae, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. Sec generally the superb symposium at 72 St. John's L. Rev. (1998), and compare Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 St. John's L.
Rev. 911 (1998) with David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments:
Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 St. John's
L. Rev. 975 (1998).
10. Although it isn't accurate to say that stop and frisk would have been entirely
outside the judicial purview absent Terry, just that there would be no uniform Supreme
Court standard.
II. In counterpoint to Miranda. See John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk
Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 749, 789
(1998) (citing comments of Justice Fortas memorialized in Justice Douglas' conference
notes about Terry).
12. Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 40, 46 (1968).
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has been inexorably away from Terry's narrow holding and toward increased police discretion.
At the same time, the Court'itself began using Terry's balancing test as a means of adopting more sweeping rules permitting whole categories of conduct to be investigated under the
Terry criteria, rather than under the traditional Fourth Amendment requisites of probable cause and a warrant. Thus the legacy of Terry is a doubly unfortunate one. Judicial review has not
succeeded in controlling the widespread abuse of stop and frisk/ 3
the vast brunt of which falls, as it did in 1968, on minority suspects.14 Whatever the result of declaring stop and frisk unconstitutional or of refusing to review its constitutionality might have
been, the result of Terry was to legalize and place the High
Court's imprimatur on a practice that serves as a tool to harass
and abuse minority citizens. In addition, the doctrinal basis the
Court used to achieve its "narrow" holding in Terry has inexorably expanded to permit numerous police practices to flourish,
unaccompanied by probable cause, a warrant, or, in many cases,
any level of suspicion at all. 15
But this kind of armchair quarterbacking 16 is easy. The far
harder question is whether we would be better off now if Terry
hadn't been decided. I've come to believe, partly aided by chaos
theory, that the question may be an incoherent one. Or perhaps
it is particularly incoherent in the context of assessing Terry.
Terry asks the question at the heart of criminal procedure: what
is the correct balance between government intrusion and individual autonomy? There can be no answer to this question that
isn't shaped by time, place, vantage point, and a host of interactive, evolving societal forces.
What systems would have been affected if Terry hadn't
been decided? Police departments, obviously. One variable is
the trajectory of police behavior in the face of a lack of Supreme
13. See, e.g., David Kocicniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacrs a Toll on the
Street, N.Y. Times AI (Feb. 15, 1999) (citing statistic that of over 45 thousand frisks performed by the NYPD Street Crimes Unit, under 10 thousand turned up any weapons.)
14. Sec, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbcrt, The Perils of Safety, The New Yorker 50, 52
(March 22, 1999) (though stop and frisk looks like a racially neutral tactic, in practice in
New York it has resulted in thousands upon thousands of young black and Latino men
getting searched for weapons).
IS. See, e.g., the "special needs" cases, including Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) and Vernonia School District 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
(1995) (drug testing).
16. It seemed appropriate to mix a football metaphor with my discussion of chaos
theory, since football is another area about which I know very little.
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Court guidance. Police would continue to stop and frisk suspects, with most of the impact occurring in poor and minority
neighborhoods. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement noted in 1967 that this differential treatment, this accrual
of petty and not so petty humiliations, was taking its toll on the
affected neighborhoods. The report also noted that it was predictable that such police-citizen encounters would occasionally
escalate, and particularly in the broader context of continuing
mistreatment, would occasionally lead to serious civil disturbances.17 Would police departments have responded to escalating tensions by generating internal regulations or changing their
training and disciplinary regimes? This would depend on the
pressures they faced and the action or inaction of local, state and
federal legislative, administrative and other political bodies.
Perhaps they would have felt more need to do so in the absence
of Supreme Court action.
The behavior (and to some extent the actual composition)
of policymaking bodies, in turn, would have been heavily influenced by public perceptions and attitudes. 18 For example, if the
conventional wisdom is that Richard Nixon was elected in some
significant part because of public reaction to the Warren Court's
perceived pro-criminal, pro-minority stance, it is difficult to
gauge what effect silence from the Court in the face of escalating
police abuse might have had on electoral outcomes and political
policymaking. Would it have led to more sympathy for poorly
treated minorities, or to even greater fear of crime? To widespread indignation on behalf of innocent, hardworking citizens
brutalized and humiliated by arrogant cops, or on behalf of
hardworking, working class cops trying to do their jobs under
dangerous circumstances? How would those perceptions have
affected public behavior at the polls, or the behavior of elected
officials? And where would they fit within the context of all the
other shifting social and economic factors that made the political
landscape during the Warren Court very different from that of
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts?
Absent Terry, lower courts, lacking guidance, would continue generating contradictory decisions that called the scope of
basic fourth amendment principles (such as search, seizure, con17. Brief of NAACP at 62-68 (cited in note 6) citing The President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police
(1967).
18. Which in tum would be influenced by the Court's behavior-its decision to
place its imprimatur on certain practices and to treat others as beyond its purview.
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sent, and probable cause) into question and gave little guidance
to street level cops. Stop and frisk statutes were being passed
and needed to be evaluated. 19 Such uncertainty would lead to
some sort of reaction, though not necessarily from the judiciary.
It is also difficult to predict what the lack of Terry would
mean for the course of Supreme Court precedent. How would it
have affected Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, or criminal
procedure jurisprudence? Would it have led to more expansive
definitions of probable cause or consent, greater tolerance of
pretextual grounds for police intrusion, or narrower definitions
of search and seizure? 20 But why assume any particular amendment or set of amendments is a discrete system? Perhaps, if not
for Terry, the Court might eventually have dealt with the issues
of unequal treatment raised by stop and frisk through the equal
protection clause, for example.
It is said that Terry was a response to hydraulic pressures
building up in the Warren Court in the aftermath of Brown v
Board of Education, Brown v. Allen, Mapp and Miranda, and
that the Court felt it could not afford another anti-police, prominority decision. 21 To the extent the Court did see itself as
having a finite amount of capital to expend, and to the extent it
had an overall plan for spending it, who knows what the lack of
Terry would have done to that accounting. But this analysis
treats the Warren Court, if only for descriptive purposes, as a
discrete system. Like any other court, the Warren Court was itself an unstable and evolving system. 22 It (and its successor
courts) evolved through inevitable changes in personnel, leadership, vision, and political context. Its decisions evolved through
the common law process, the vagaries of individual cases, the
makeup and interpretations of lower courts, and all the other
obvious variables that make the path of the law unpredictable.

19. Barrett, 72 St. John's L. Rev. at 760 (cited in note 11).
20. Interestingly, all of these came to pass anyway. Sec, c,g., Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983) (lowering probable cause threshold); Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218 (1973) (adopting broad definition of consent); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984) (adopting narrow definition of search); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)
(adopting narrow definition of seizure); and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
(holding evidence of pretext irrelevant).
21. Maclin, 72 St. John's L. Rev. at 1318 (cited in note 7) (citing Justice Douglas's
dissent in Terry).
22. Sec Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really so Defense-Minded?), The
Burger Coun (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices,
in Vincent Blasi, ed., The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't 62, 62-68
(Yale U. Press, 1983) (critiquing the notion of a unitary Warren Court).
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A question like "what if Terry hadn't been decided?" seems
to assume a stable environment, a jigsaw puzzle with one piece
removed. But, in Ron Allen's and Ross Rosenberg's insightful
description, the common law system is a "grown" rather than a
"made" system;23 a system with too many variables to yield any
sort of predictive certainty. 24 This point holds true for all the
other interlocking systems discussed above. There is no overall
top-down plan. And there are no discrete systems at work here
either, just a complex set of forces, actions and reactions, causes,
effects and feedback loops, all in constant flux.
Was Terry wrongly decided? Yes. It didn't achieve what it
set out to; it never faced the racial issues that have, if anything,
worsened; and it arguably placed its imprimatur on an abusive
set. of practices. In the bargain it seriously damaged the structure of Fourth Amendment law, allowing for an ad hoc, unprincipled balancing whose costs go far beyond the excesses of stop
and frisk. Would we have been better off without it? That depends.

23. Ronald J. Allen and Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 St. Johns L. Rev. 1149,
1189-98 (1998)

24. See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 110,
113-14 (1991).

